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Phenomenal Precision and Some 
Possible Pitfalls
A Commentary on Ned Block
Sascha Benjamin Fink
Ground Representationism is the position that for each phenomenal feature there
is a representational feature that accounts for it. Against this thesis, Ned Block
has provided an intricate argument that rests on the notion of “phenomenal preci-
sion”: the phenomenal precision of a percept may change at a different rate from
its representational counterpart. If so, there is then no representational feature
that accounts for a specific change of this phenomenal feature. Therefore, Ground
Representationism cannot be generally true.
Although the notion of phenomenal precision is intuitive, it is admittedly in
need of clarification. Here I reconstruct Block’s argument by suggesting a way of
estimating phenomenal precision that is based on the assumption that parts of
perceptual wholes can share phenomenal features independently of their place in
the whole. Understood like this, the overall argument shows what it is supposed
to show.
A more thorough look at the notion of phenomenal precision suggests ten-
sion with Block’s other work: in order to be non-trivial, we have to accept that
some of our phenomenality is not concrete, but only generic. Such “solely generic
phenomenology”, however, is a position mainly held by opponents to Block’s Ac-
cess- vs. Phenomenal Consciousness-distinction. Interpreting phenomenal impreci-
sion as constituted by introspective imprecision does not suffice as a way out. It
seems that phenomenal precision is either trivial, self-contradictory, or incompat-
ible with Block’s position elsewhere. So some additional elucidation on this cru-
cial notion is needed.
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1 Introduction: Running 
representationism into the ground
Imagine yourself in an elevator. You press the
button for the upmost floor when, all of a sud-
den,  you  smell  something  nauseating:  a  foul
metallic odor permeates your nostrils and raises
disgust until all your attention is focused (un-
fortunately) on this olfactory catastrophe.  How
it  smells  is  not the question. The odor has a
very  determinate  character—and  it  is  funky!
But what is it that you smell, what is this sen-
sation about? Maybe you left a cheese sandwich
in  your  pocket  and  forgot  about  it?  Maybe
some wiring went faulty? Or the breaks? Maybe
your colleague cut one out? Even though you
don’t  know  what it  is  you are experiencing—
what your experience is about, its content, or
representational aspect—, you do know  how it
is like to smell  this stench—you know its ap-
pearance,  its  character,  its  configurational1 or
1 For the distinction between representational and configurational as-
pects see Wollheim (1987). Nanay (2005) used these termini vis-à-vis
Fink, S. (2015). Phenomenal Precision and Some Possible Pitfalls - A Commentary on Ned Block.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 5(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570887 1 | 14
www.open-mind.net
phenomenal aspects.  What  is  the  relation
between  content  and  character  in  such  per-
cepts?
Representationists give  the  following  an-
swer to this question: all phenomenal features of
an experience (its appearance or character) are
dependent on its  representational  features  (its
content):  how you experience is determined by
what you  experience.  Ned Block (forthcoming
2015)2 has provided a useful way of taxonomiz-
ing Representationists further: Identity-Repres-
entationism (IR) is the claim that the character
of  an  experience  is  nothing  but  its  content.
However,  content  here  cannot  be  more  basic
than character, because identity is symmetrical.
Character then determines content just as con-
tent determines character, because both are just
one and the same. Also, if we want to explain or
reduce character to content, then IR is not the
way to go, because reduction—unlike identity—
is asymmetric, and so is explanation.3
That an experience’s content is more basic
and  determines  its  character  (but  not  vice
versa) can be captured in two ways: Superveni-
ence-Representationism (SR) is the claim that
every change in phenomenal character necessit-
ates a change in the content of the experience,
but not vice versa. But SR leaves open  which
change in content determines a specific change
in  character.  In  Ground-Representationism
(GR),  however,  not  any  change  will  do:  the
change in character must have a change in con-
tent that accounts for the change in character.
Say you experience a change in the size of
a gap, e.g. it grows larger. If that experience’s
character merely supervenes on its content, then
the appearance of a growing gap does not neces-
sitate that your experience is  about a growing
gap—something has to change in content, but it
doesn’t need to be this specific change. This ap-
pearance  may be  brought  about  by a  change
from being about a gap of size  x to a smaller
gap of size y, or about the gap changing color,
aesthetic pictorial experiences. We may apply this distinction to ex-
periences more generally.
2 See also the article in this collection.
3 At least, most often explanations are seen as asymmetric. For ex-
ample, Schindler (2013) has remarked that the mechanistic explana-
tions à la Craver (2007) violate asymmetry, which he sees as a short-
coming of Craver’s account.
or about your toe starting to twitch while you
look at the gap—any change might do without
violating the letter of SR. However, if an experi-
ence’s character is grounded in its content, then
the change in content must account for the ap-
pearance.  It  seems  that  only  being  about  a
growing gap truly accounts for the appearance
of a growing gap. If we want to be Representa-
tionists, GR seems like our best option: it al-
lows us to (i) differentiate content from charac-
ter, (ii) see content as more basic than charac-
ter, (iii) capture that phenomenal character is
dependent on content, but not  vice versa, and
(iv) make content accountable for character.
However, character is not grounded in con-
tent, Block argues:4 GR is false. This assessment
is motivated by empirical considerations. There
are many gems in Block’s article, but I will fo-
cus mainly on the crown jewel, which is the ar-
gument based on “phenomenal precision”. It is
subtle and intricate, so my first step is to recon-
struct it (with a bit of elaboration) in section 3.
In section 4, I point to a few oddities and ten-
sions I see with Block’s other work. I do not see
these tensions as offering a decisive blow to his
argument, but as a plea for an elaboration on
how Block thinks about phenomenal precision.
(My  main  argument  meanders  through  the
main text. I keep it concise, but some points de-
serve  some  technical  elaboration—thus  the
abundance of  footnotes.  They may be treated
like beetroot on a buffet, i.e. skipped with clean
conscience.)
2 “Phenomenal precision”
The notion  of  phenomenal  precision plays  an
important  role  in  Block’s  argument.  He  (this
collection, p. 45 & 47) admits that it is a notion
in need of clarification—but one where a lack of
definition  ought  not  give  us  headaches,  since
many concepts pertaining to phenomenality lack
definability.5
4 This is not his first argument against Representationism (see e.g.,
Block 1996), but I will focus mainly on his The Puzzle of Perceptual
Precision in this collection.
5 This has become somewhat like a signature move for Block. Con-
sider  e.g.:  “You  ask:  What  is  it  that  philosophers  have  called
qualitative  states?  I  answer,  only  half  in  jest:  As  Louis  Arm-
strong said when asked what jazz is, ‘If you got to ask, you aint
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We can think of precision as connected to
bandwidth. What does that mean? Some vari-
ations in the external world do not factor into
how the world feels to us. For example, one can-
not differentiate a grating of 20% contrast from
one of 20.2%, or a pain caused by heat of 480
millicalories  per  second per  square  centimeter
from one caused by 640 mc/sec/cm² (Hardy et
al. 1940; Hardy et al. 1952). However, there is a
point  where  the  variance  in  the  stimulus  be-
comes  just  noticeable,  e.g.,  a  pain  of  660
mc/sec/cm² does feel different from one at 480.
This can be measured behaviorally, namely if a
subject is able to distinguish one item of type A
from another of type B above chance based on
the relevant feature (e.g., if 75% of all presented
items  are  distinguished  correctly).  So  all  the
variance that I cannot distinguish perceptually
between two just noticeable differences (JNDs)
is covered by percepts with the same phenom-
enal character. That is, if I have a percept  a,
different states of affairs may have caused  a—
and the  phenomenal  character  of  the  percept
does  not  convey  its  real  cause.  So  percepts
ought  to  count as  a  bit  imprecise.  The more
cases are covered by a percept, the less precise:
a visual-contrast-percept that can be caused by
20±1% contrast is more precise than one that
can be caused by 20±3%.
never gonna get to know.’” (Block 1991, p. 217)
Or:  “I  cannot  define  [phenomenal  consciousness]  in  any  remotely
noncircular way. I don’t consider this an embarrassment. The history
of reductive definitions in philosophy should lead one not to expect a
reductive definition of anything. The best one can do for [phenom-
enal consciousness] is in some respects worse than for many other
concepts, though, because really all one can do is point to the phe-
nomenon (cf. Goldman 1993a). Nonetheless, it is important to point
properly.” (Block 1997, p. 230)
He continues by stating that synonyms and examples are the best
way of conveying what is meant by “phenomenal consciousness”.
I do not thank that this is unreasonable, but instead intellectu-
ally honest.  Chalmers  (2011, p. 545) may have provided a good
explanation of why it is so hard to provide a real definition for
“phenomenality”:  It might be a bedrock concept,  which cannot
be decomposed into more basic concepts, because it is itself most
basic—it  captures  the  fundamental  distinction  between  reality
and its appearance to us:
“[…] a dispute is bedrock relative to an expression: so the dispute
over ‘Mice are conscious’ might be bedrock with respect to ‘con-
scious’  but not with respect to ‘mice’.  A substantive dispute  is
bedrock relative to an expression  E when no underlying dispute
can be found by applying the method of elimination to E [i.e., re-
placing  E  in disputes by another expression where people agree
on the meaning]:  roughly,  when there  is  no  underlying  dispute
that does not involve E or cognates.”  
If an expression is bedrock, then it cannot be elucidated by conceptual
analysis—and there cannot be any non-stipulative real definition.
Percepts  have  representational  and  phe-
nomenal aspects—content and character. Preci-
sion  certainly  makes  sense  when  it  comes  to
content, because “[t]he representational content
of a perception is—constitutively—the veridical-
ity conditions”, Block writes (this collection, p.
27).6 So we can look at the range of cases in the
world  that  make  a  percept  veridical,  and
thereby determine its degree of representational
precision based on the range of cases that may
have caused it in that obtaining condition. If,
for example, a Gabor patch with 22% contrast
looks just like one with a 28% contrast,  then
the representational content of this percept has
a degree of precision of at least 6%, because all
cases between 22% and 28% are covered by the
same phenomenal appearance. Otherwise, these
two Gabors would not look the same.
Representational  precision  makes  sense—
but  how  about  phenomenal precision?  Intuit-
ively, phenomenal precision sounds good: things
may  appear  red or  crimson,  and  because  all
things crimson are a subset of all things red, the
bandwidth of  both ways of  seeing-as differs—
and therefore they ought to count as differently
precise.
But if we can diagnose differences in the
degree of phenomenal precision, we need a way
of estimating its degree. How would we do this?
GR provides an easy answer: phenomenal preci-
sion is  grounded in  representational  precision,
so we can use the same methods by which we
estimate representational precision to estimate
phenomenal  precision.  But  in  an  argument
where  GR is  under  scrutiny,  one  cannot  pre-
sume this without begging the question. So we
must look for another way of  estimating phe-
nomenal precision. 
For this purpose, Block suggests the Phe-
nomenal Precision Principle (PPP), which we
may reconstruct as: If the percept of item  i1
and the percept of  item  i2 are phenomenally
indistinguishable with respect to some feature
F under  condition  A,  but  phenomenally  de-
terminately different vis-à-vis  F under condi-
tion B, then the experience in A is less precise
than in B.
6 This is in the spirit of Burge (2010, pp. 55–60), whom Block cites in
this context.
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So if I cannot differentiate two stimuli by
their contrast in condition A, but can differenti-
ate the two by contrast in condition B, then my
experience in A is less precise than in B. Why?
Because if I can tell the two items apart phe-
nomenally,  then  I  can  distinguish  cases,  and
therefore  the  bandwidth  of  that  experience  is
narrower.
Block uses differences in phenomenal pre-
cision prominently in an argument against GR:
he believes that in some cases, phenomenal pre-
cision (p–precision) and representational preci-
sion  (r–precision)  can  fall  apart.  If  GR were
true,  such  that  representational  features  must
account for phenomenal ones, then this cannot
be the case. But this is exactly what happens,
according to  Block: “there is evidence that at-
tended and foveal perception can be greater in
[phenomenal precision] without involving aware-
ness of more precise environmental properties”
(this collection, p. 41). Then, GR is false.
3 Block’s precision argument
What  evidence  speaks  for  Block’s  thesis  that
“attended and foveal perception can be greater
in  [phenomenal  precision]  without  involving
awareness of more precise environmental prop-
erties” (this collection, p. 41)? (For those who
have read the original article and have a firm
grasp of the argument based on precision, this
part may be skipped for the discussion in sec-
tion 4.)
3.1 The stimulus and the conditions of 
viewing
Consider  the  stimuli  in  figure  1 taken from
Carrasco et al. (2004, p. 310), and mentioned
by Block twice (figure 7 and 9 in his article).
It  shows three  Gabor  patches  of  16%,  22%,
and 28% contrast—call these stimuli g16, g22,
and g28 respectively. If we look directly (i.e.,
foveate)  at and attend to each of these stim-
uli, the percepts they cause are decidedly dif-
ferent  to  each  other.  Call  this  condition
“SFAG”  for  stimuli  foveated,  attention  on
gabors.  However,  if  we  fixate  on  the  black
spot  between  the  patches  (such  that  the
patches  are  more  in  the  periphery  of  our
visual field) but attend to the one with lower
contrast (i.e., to the left of where we fixate),
then the percepts they cause appear indistin-
guishable from one another.  Call this condi-
tion “SPAL” for stimuli peripheral, attention
on lower contrast. This comparative indistin-
guishability does not arise if we attend to the
higher  contrast  patch  or  to  the  spot  in  the
middle.  Call  these  conditions  “SPAH”  for
stimuli  peripheral,  attention  to  higher  con-
trast and “SPAF” for  stimuli  peripheral,  at-
tention to fixation spot, respectively.7
7 See also table 1. We may also introduce the following formalism:
Ch(x) stands  for  the  character  of  a  percept  of  x (the  external
stimulus); Ch(x&y) stands for the character of perceiving stimuli
x and y together, i.e., a mereological fusion of simultaneously oc-
curring characters at a moment in time t. The comparative char-
acter is then:
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Table 1: The character in each condition of viewing/at-
tending to the stimulus of 22% and 28% in figure 1. (See
also footnote 7.)
Abbreviation Condition Character 
SFAS Stimulus foveated,
attention on stimulus
distinguishable
SPAS Stimulus peripheral,
attention on fixation spot
distinguishable
SPAH Stimulus peripheral,
attention on higher contrast
distinguishable
SPAL Stimulus peripheral,
attention on lower contrast
indistinguishable
3.2 The evidence for attention influencing
appearance
It seems that attention alters appearance. Our
main evidence is introspective: we can reliably
produce such changes in appearance from SPAH
to SPAF to SPAL by shifting attention.  This
works even if we know of the effect.
To an external observer, there is evidence
available from naïve subjects: If these subjects
have to name the orientation of the patch with
the higher contrast (  vs.  ), they choose at↙ ↘
chance level in SPAL even if there is a contrast
difference of 6%.8 (The shift  in attention was
SFAG: Ch(g22) ≠ Ch(g28)
SPAF: Ch(g22 &g28)≈(Ch(g22) ≠ Ch(g28))
SPAH: Ch(g22 &g28)≈(Ch(g22) ≠ Ch(g28))
SPAL: Ch(g22 &g28)≈(Ch(g22) = Ch(g28))
Note that just because phenomenal parts share identical phenomenal
character, these parts themselves need not be identical: they may oc-
cur at different moments in time, be part of different phenomenal
wholes, or be arranged in a different manner; if any of these extrinsic
properties were among the identity conditions of phenomenal parts,
then a ≠ b; however, the character of some a may still be identical to
the character of b.
If phenomenally-unified percepts are mereologically organized, as sugges-
ted by Bayne (2010), as well as Wiese & Metzinger (2012), then:  if a
percept at t1 has Ch(x &y)t1=(Ch(x)t1≠Ch(y)t1) and a percept at t2 has
Ch(x &y)t2=(Ch(x)t2=Ch(y)t2),  then Ch(x)t1≠Ch(x)t2 or Ch(y)t1≠Ch(y)t2.
This is the case in the experiment by Carrasco et al. (2004, p. 310);
so under these presumptions, the appearances of parts of the overall
percept must change between the conditions, because the character
of the whole changes.
8 That is, the point of subjective equality (PSE) differs between the
conditions.  PSEs  are  determined  by  that  configuration  where  a
forced choice between stimuli is chancy.  Carrasco et al. (see  2004,
p. 311, figure 5a) kept a g22 fixed (standard) and varied the other
patch (test). So one condition (cue to test) covered what I call here
SPAH and SPAL, as in some cases, the test patch had a lower, in
some a higher contrast than the standard g22. (This is merely a dif-
ference in presentation, which does not influence the overall argu-
ment. Their presentation simply provides a continuous psychometric
exogenously  triggered  by  a  visual  cue  27ms
prior to stimulus onset.) Because subjects have
to decide which grating looks higher in contrast,
and pick the lower or the higher contrast patch
at random, it is reasonable to assume that the
two look the same: they have identical character
in SPAL. Thus, attention affects appearance.
3.3 The contents and degree of r–
precision in different conditions
So the character of comparative percepts (the
character of experiencing two patches together)
differs  between  these  conditions,  even  if  the
stimuli and the way we fixate remain the same.
But what about the respective contents?
In SFAG, we can clearly tell the patches
apart.  If  percepts  are  constitutively  veridical
(because otherwise they are not percepts, but il-
lusions or hallucinations), then the content of a
percept  is  determined  by  the  actual  world.
Thus, the content of each percept of a patch is
(approximately) its actual contrast.9
In SPAF, the patches look different. How-
ever, as our ability to tell contrasts apart is a
bit lower in the periphery, the contrast-JND is a
bit  higher—say,  3%.10 So  the  content  of  the
comparative percept is one where the content of
each percept is less precise, but still discernible
from  another:  its  actual  contrast  within  the
range of a peripheral contrast-JND.
In SPAH, the comparative contrast between
the patches is more pronounced. We cannot ex-
plain this if the content in SPAH is the same as in
curve.) If the fixation spot was cued, the PSE reflects reality: a g22
looks most like g22; if the standard (g22) was cued, the test patch had
to have a higher contrast to look similar: a g28 looked most like a g22;
if the test patch was cued, the uncued patch had to have a lower
contrast to look most similar to the test: a g16 looked most like a g22.
9 The actual content is a bit more imprecise, i.e., within the range of 1
foveal contrast-JND, which is roughly 1%. Block suggests 2% overall.
In personal communication, Frank Jäkel estimated that (under ideal
experimental  conditions  with  optimal  stimuli)  the  contrast-JND
could be a log-unit lower than that: 1% provides a good ballpark es-
timate for many conditions.  He based this  estimation on his own
work done for the study published in Jäkel & Wichmann (2006). See
also Carney et al. (2000), Pelli & Bex (2013), and the locus classicus:
Fechner (1860, pp. 150ff.).
10 See Banks et al. (1991, p. 1779). Although they do not specifically
mention JNDs, they do provide data about contrast sensitivity in
different degrees of peripheral eccentricity, which suggests some in-
crease: “[T]he ideal [contrast sensitivity functions] do not exhibit the
large contrast sensitivity losses that one observes in humans with in-
creasing eccentricity.”
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SPAF.  Somehow,  the  contents  ought  to  differ
more than in SPAF. One way to do this is to see
one as more r–precise than the other. Then it is
easier to tell the two apart, because there is no
content-overlap. Another way would be to assume
that one becomes less r–precise. Then it is easier
to tell them apart because the respective minima
and maxima are further apart.11
Table 2: The content and its degree of precision in each
condition  of  viewing/attending to  the  stimulus  of  22%
and 28% in figure 1. (See also footnote 12.)
Condition Content + Bandwidth estimation
SFAS % of actual contrast ± 1 foveal JNDattended (∼ 1%);
SPAS % of actual contrast ± 1 peripheral JNDunattended (∼ 3%);
SPAH % of actual contrast ± 1 peripheral
JNDattended/± 1 peripheral JNDunattended;
(my estimation: ∼ 2%/ ∼ 3%; see also footnote 11)
SPAL at least the open interval between actual contrasts,
here ≥ 6%;
In SPAL, the comparative percept (g22 & g28
together) is such that the two patches are indistin-
guishable. So our percept is strictly speaking non-
veridical. In order to make it veridical, one has to
assign a quite imprecise content: it must at least
cover  both actual  contrasts—i.e.,  be greater  or
equal to the interval that includes the actual con-
trasts as endpoints: [22%, 28%].12
11 Block might argue that we lack a principled reason to choose one over
the other as being more or less imprecise. The argument mirrors the one
he gives concerning veridicality (see Block this collection, pp. 26ff.). As
veridicality determines the contents of percepts, one can easily adapt it:
intuitively,  one  might  think that  the  patch  one  attends  to  is  more
veridical; but attention changes appearance, so the unattended one might
be more veridical; but as one mostly acts on what one attends to, it
would be advantageous if what one acts on was most veridical. So we are
stuck in a rut. The comparative percept in SPAL is illusory, but as a
percept, it must be (partially) veridical. Block’s suggestion is (or ought to
be) that we should assume that each is veridical, but less r–precise. I’d
agree. But I think we can do more: when we focus on the higher contrast
Gabor, this increases the distance in r–precision between the compared
percepts, and thereby ought to render them more discernible. If so, then
this might apply to SPAL as well, such that the one we attend to is more
precise. I pick up on this in footnote 12.
12 See table  2. More formally, let  Co(x) stand for the content of our
percept of x, and Co(x&y) for the content of the comparative percept
of x and y together. Given the external content-determination of per-
cepts and our understanding of JNDs, we can be a bit more precise
about how imprecise content is in the different conditions.
SFAG: Co(g22)=22± ~1%; Co(g28)=28± ~1%
SPAF: Co(g22&g28)≈(Co(g22)≥ 22± ~3%,Co(g28)≥28%± ~3%)
SPAH: Co(g22&g28)≈(Co(g22)≥22± ~3%,Co(g28)≥28%± ~2%)
SPAL: Co(g22&g28)≈(Co(g22)≥[22%,28%],Co(g28)≫[22%,28%])
3.4 Estimating the degree of p–precision 
in the different conditions
So we know the percepts’ contents and r–precision
in the different conditions—but how about their
p–precision? Block agrees that this is hard to es-
timate correctly. But the PPP gives us a rough
guide: if the percept of item i1 and the percept of
item i2 are phenomenally indistinguishable with re-
spect to some feature  F  under condition  A, but
phenomenally  determinately  different  vis-à-vis  F
under condition B, then the experience in A is less
precise than in  B vis-à-vis  F. However, the case
becomes more complicated, because we also have
to think of the p–precision of comparative percepts
(experiences as a whole) in addition to the  per-
cepts compared (the parts of whole experiences),
akin to what we did in the case of r–precision.
3.4.1 Perceptual wholes and perceptual parts
At each moment, you have a broad range of dif-
ferent  sensations;  but  all  of  these  together  are
parts of one massive phenomenal  me-here-now-
with-this-and-that-whole: at a bar, you smell the
mixture of spilt beer and sweat, taste the medi-
cinal-peaty  taste  of  your  Lagavulin,  while  you
ogle  a  lovely  co-member  of  your  species—who
makes you feel your heart pumping in your chest.
But you don’t feel all these separately; they are
fused into one fleeting holistic experience. 
If  phenomenal  wholes  are  not  character–
identical, there must be a difference in their parts;
but some distinguishable phenomenal wholes may
still share parts with identical phenomenal char-
acter: the feel of your beating heart while ogling
may be phenomenally identical to the feeling of
your beating heart after escaping the oglee’s signi-
ficant other.
3.4.2 Unattended parts can share 
character with attended parts
Just as temperature can alter the taste of sugar
to caramel without being sugar or caramel, at-
tention  can  affect  phenomenal  character
without itself  having a phenomenal  character:
attention  alters the appearance of  x,  but there
seems to be no additional phenomenal character
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as of attending to x. If so, then the phenomenal
character of a perceptual part itself does not de-
termine  whether  this  part  is  attended  to  or
not.13 So a percept  that is  now in the atten-
tional limelight may share its character with a
counterpart in the attentional shadow: If I at-
tend to a leaf in a tree, the leaf I focus on may
look just as green as a leaf in my visual peri-
phery that I experience but don’t care about.
This is one interpretation of SPAL: the percept
of the attended peripheral g22 shares its charac-
ter  with  the  percept  of  the  unattended  peri-
pheral g28-patch.14
3.4.3 An estimation of p–precision in the 
different conditions
Now, we may consider what the p–precision is in
our cases. In SFAG, over the range of 1 foveal
contrast-JND, all percepts look the same. This is
the most p–precise that the character of a percept
can be.  The  p–precision  range  is  then  roughly
centered around some value n±x%, where x is ap-
proximately 1 foveally attended contrast-JND.15
In  SPAF,  the  patches  look  determinately
different; and in SPAH, they look even more dif-
13 One reviewer doubted whether this holds generally. It might be that
a weaker version is easier to defend: an appearance does not neces-
sarily specify whether it is attended to or not. I suspect that Block
tends towards a stronger reading, as it seems to be in line with the
dissociation between phenomenal consciousness and access. My re-
construction hinges on the strong version. For otherwise, the stability
of p–precision I suggest in section 3.4.3 does not arise. So if there are
good reasons to doubt the strong version, there are good reasons to
doubt my reconstruction ↓ and also Block’s argument itself,  I  be-
lieve. Here, I simply admit this weakness, but cannot follow up on
this criticism due to lack of space. However, I see no good reason for
assuming that attention has a unique and distinguishable perceptual
character. (It might even be contentious whether it has a cognitive,
agentive, or any phenomenal character at all, but I will not get into
this here.)
14 It is unclear whether the identity in character must be part of the
experience for Block’s argument. It seems that he thinks this way.
But  consider Williamson (1990,  p.  60;  my emphasis),  who writes
that the “discriminability of a pair of characters as presented by a
pair of experiences depends on non-qualitative relations between the
experiences — relations not fixed by the way in which the experi-
ences present their characters — which facilitate or hinder discrimin-
ation […].” He envisions where the compared characters are placed in
time and the visual field, but one might also consider, as I do in sec-
tion 4.3, that our ability or inability to tell characters apart is a de-
pendent on our cognitive abilities.
15 We cannot give the exact value of n, because the character of a per-
cept is independent of whether one attends to it or foveates on it;
and in SPAL,  percepts  of  different  actual  contrast  can share  the
same character. So we cannot associate the  p–precision value with
any value pertaining to a stimulus. Still, we may assume that it has
a value. So I use some mock-value n.
ferent. It is in the spirit of PPP (see  p.  3) that
the comparative percept in SPAH is more p–pre-
cise than the comparative percept in SPAF.
But because the character of a percept is in-
dependent of whether one attends to or foveates
on it, each compared percept (the parts of which
the comparative percept is composed) ought to be
similarly p–precise as in SFAG: if parts inside and
outside the focus of attention can share phenom-
enal character, and if this holds for all characters,
then  the  same range  of  characters  can  appear
anywhere in our visual experience. So we ought to
expect the same range of PPP–cases in the peri-
phery as in the fovea. Then, the character ought
to count as similarly p–precise.
3.5 The argument
If I am correct so far, we can state the follow-
ing: (P1) If the character of an attended and an
unattended  percept  can  be  identical  (section
3.4.2), then perceptual parts are overall more p–
precise than r–precise, because the range of  p–
precision–values of compared percepts is stable
in all conditions (table  3), but the range of  r–
precision must vary in order to account for the
veridicality  of  percepts  (table  2).  (P2)  If  the
character  of  an  attended  and  an  unattended
percept  can  be  identical,  then  our  compared
percepts (the parts of the comparative percept)
are  more  p–precise  than  r–precise  in  SPAL.16
But if GR were true, then there must be a rep-
resentational feature that accounts for each phe-
nomenal  feature.  This  applies  to  precision  as
well, because—according to Block—p–precision
is a phenomenal feature of one’s perception. So
if GR were true, representational precision must
account for phenomenal precision. But (P1) and
(P2) stand in direct opposition to this. So, by
modus tollens, GR ought to be considered false.
4 On the notion of “phenomenal 
precision”
Any argument against Representationism has an
initial appeal to me. Ned Block’s is at the cutting
edge of empirical research and subtle in its argu-
16 Block’s main argument rests on (P2)↓ but I hope that (P1) is in his
spirit.
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mentation.  But I  suspect  that  its crown jewel,
“phenomenal precision”, has a few shady facets.
“Phenomenal precision”, Block admits, is in
need  of  clarification.  The  guiding  example  for
Block (this collection) is where “[t]he experience
of a color as red is less phenomenologically [sic]
precise than the experience of a color as crimson”.
Here I want to focus a bit more on how we may
understand p–precision, what it might and what
it ought not to mean in the context of Block’s
work.
Table  3:  The  approximated  phenomenal  precision  in
each condition of viewing/attending. How  p–precise the
comparative percepts  (g22&g28 perceived together) are can
be ordered from lowest to highest: SPAH>SPAF>SPAL.
(See also footnotes 7 and 12.)
Condition Approximated Phenomenal Bandwidth
SFAG ni ± x% of contrast, where x is roughly 1 foveal JND;
Ch(g22%) = n1 ± x%; Ch(g28%)=n2 ± x%
SPAF Ch(g22%&g28%)=
((Ch(g22%) = n3 ± x%) < (Ch(g28%)n4 ± x%))
SPAH Ch(g22%&g28%)=
((Ch(g22%) = n5 ± x%) ≪ (Ch(g28%)n6 ± x%)
SPAL Ch(g22%&g28%) =
((Ch(g22%) = n7 ± x%) = (Ch(g28%)n4 ± x%))
4.1 Lower bounds of p–precision
The way I estimated phenomenal precision in my
reconstruction was as follows: consider, first, how
a controlled stimulus appears under ideal condi-
tions (e.g., rested, attending, etc.) as some phe-
nomenal  feature.  For  example,  how  blue34 in  a
standardized patch looks  as blue, how an olfact-
ory sample (e.g., a CAS 93686-30-7, Ext. Sup. I,
1000ppm)  smells  as  Ylang-Ylang,  how  480
mc/sec/cm² feels  as pain, and so on. Then, see
how  much  variance  in  the  stimulus  is  not
mirrored in the appearance as F: for example, the
pain caused by 480 mc/sec/cm² is not reliably
discernible from one caused by 640 mc/sec/cm²;
instead both feel as pain near maximal intensity.
Because I cannot differentiate between 480 mc/sec/cm²
and 640 mc/sec/cm² by the feeling they cause,
my pain feeling’s p–precision must at least cover
these values. This provides us with a lower bound
for that specific feeling of pain. More broadly, for
any  phenomenal  character—i.e.,  experiencing
something as F (e.g., a color as red, a tone as C ’,♯
a  patch  as  having  28% contrast)—,  the  lower
bound of its p–precision is that range of cases one
cannot distinguish by experiencing as  F  under
ideal conditions. That’s what the PPP suggests
(see p. 3).
This allows us to make sense of the red vs.
crimson example: crimson is a very specific phe-
nomenal feel, which allows for very little variation
while remaining crimson. Red, on the other hand,
allows variation along the whole spectrum, from
coral and vermillion, via crimson and oxblood, to
maroon. So any experience of a color as crimson
is also likely to be17 an experience of a color as
red—but so is an experience of a color as vermil-
lion. And the range of cases that may cause an
experience of  red compared to those that may
cause an experience of crimson under ideal condi-
tion is larger. So experiencing as crimson is more
p–precise than experiencing as red.
4.2 A need for solely generic 
phenomenology?
I think that triviality or contradiction looms if we
do not add another constraint to be satisfied: In
order for p–precision to be non-trivial, there must
be the possibility of experiencing a color as red,
but  not as  crimson42,  vermillion11,  coral19,
oxblood81, etc. That is, there must be a way of ex-
periencing something as a higher–order property
F, without experiencing it as any first-order prop-
erty F1, F2, … subsumable under  F.  Rick Grush
(2007) has called this  Generic Phenomenology—
but I am speaking more specifically of solely gen-
eric  phenomenology  (SGP),  i.e.,  generic  phe-
nomenology without an accompanying and sub-
sumable concretum.18
Why ought  we  commit  ourselves  to  SGP?
Because otherwise the p–precision of an experience
17 Likely but not necessarily, because experiencing as crimson is not
necessarily related to experiencing as red. Conceptual or nomolo-
gical relations do not necessarily transfer to the realm of experi-
ences.  Imagine  seeing  an  animal  as  a  mouse.  One  does  not
thereby see  it  as an owner of  a heart, or  as a member of  the
phylum chordata  even though all  mice  belong to each category
necessarily.
18 See also the discussion and specifically Block’s response R2 on Block
(2007) for more on generic phenomenology.
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is either contradictory, generally minimal, or gener-
ally maximal, which trivializes the notion. Why?
Look at the color in figure 2. What is the p–
precision of this color impression?
Figure  2:  A stimulus  of  color  660000  or  16-86-94-42
CMYK.
You  probably  experience  this  color  as
red, but also as having a specific shade of red
—for which you might lack a name, but let us
baptize  it  cayenne66.  It  is  natural  to  assume
that this holds for all color impressions, e.g.,
that whenever you experience a color as red,
you  also  experience  it  as  a  most  specific
shade. In this case,  there is  no SGP—just a
generic  phenomenology  accompanied  by  con-
crete and “subsumable” phenomenology. What
might be the p–precision of your color impres-
sion in this scenario?
You might think that this color experience
has two p–precision values:19 The first value is for
being experienced as red, and the second for be-
ing experienced as cayenne66. But this seems con-
tradictory: why should one and the same experi-
ence of a color have two  p–precision values, but
only one for  r–precision? And for that matter,
why not three values for  p–precision? You likely
experience the color not only as cayenne66 and as
red, but also  as a color? Why not four, then, if
you experience it as a visual experience? Or five,
if you experience it as something? Or even six, if
you experience it  as phenomenal? The more op-
tions we consider, the less sense it makes to speak
of the p–precision of a percept at all. But this is
needed for Block’s argument, where changes in p–
precision are lower than the respective changes in
r–precision. This hardly works if we allow mul-
tiple values. So we should assign experiences only
one p–precision value.
If  we have to assign this color experience
only one p–precision value, we could either choose
19 I speak as if  we could know the determinate value of p–precision
given as a real number here. But this is not required: There could be
a determinate value without us being able to know it.
the lowest or the highest feature. Either option
looks arbitrary, which is already bad. But it gets
worse if we reject SGP: If we chose the lowest fea-
ture (cayenne66) and if  there must always be a
lowest feature, then all experiences of a type have
the same level of p–precision and this value must
be stable. If we chose the higher feature (red),
then there is no reason to stop there: we certainly
experience the color as a color, as a visual impres-
sion, or as something. But the character of being
something applies to (almost) every experience.
So all experiences would again be equally and fix-
edly  p–precise. Both cases seem to trivialize the
notion of p–precision, because it always stays the
same. So  p–precision seems either contradictory
or static and trivial without SGP.
We ought to accept SGP in order to allow
for  variance  in  p–precision:  we  can  experience
some color as red, but not as e.g., cayenne66 and
so on. More generally, we can experience some-
thing  only as a higher–order property  F without
experiencing it as any lower order property F1,
F2, … subsumable under F. Then, different experi-
ences allow for different degrees of indeterminacy
and therefore different degrees of p–precision.
However, SGP has been introduced to argue
against Block: According to  Grush (2007), if we
accept the possibility of generic phenomenology,
then  we  could  see  something  as  some letter
without seeing it as  a specific letter (A, B, ...).
This affects one’s interpretation of the Sperling
experiment: Sperling (1960) showed participants a
grid  of  letters,  which  they  identified  as  letters
from  the  short  impression  they  got.  Yet  they
could not identify and recount all of them. But
when they were cued to repeat a specific line by a
tone  after the stimulus disappeared,  they were
able to recount the letters in that line without
fault. Block (2007) has used this and other exper-
iments to argue that phenomenality goes beyond
what we can cognitively access: people have a full
phenomenal impression, but cannot access all the
information  available  in  their  experience.  Their
experience is concrete, but their introspective ac-
cess is shaky. SGP proponents counter that one
can have generic experiences while all the under-
lying concrete information is subconscious. So be-
fore the cue, subjects experience concretely ac-
cording  to  Block,  but  generically  according  to
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proponents  of  SGP.  Allowing SGP thus  blocks
Block.
Additionally,  generic  phenomenology
seems to be closely  associated with  symbolic
or  rule-based20 representation.  Imagistic rep-
resentation, on the other hand, does not allow
for such indeterminacy, because images exploit
the  isomorphisms  between  concreta.  I  can
write “The cat is on the mat” without saying
anything about whether the cat is a Siamese
or a Maine Coon, or whether the mat is filled
with feathers or made of bamboo, or whether
the cat reclines, sits, or scratches on the mat.
The sentence  can represent  the  fact  without
resembling a cat or a mat at all. However, if I
want to represent the fact that  the cat is on
the mat in an image, I have to depict some-
thing concrete: a specific cat at some position
on a mat doing something. The common un-
derstanding  of  images  is  that  they  are  con-
crete and as such determined in all their low-
est-order properties. Analogue representations
more generally exploit concreteness in order to
represent by isomorphism.21
Introspectively,  our  phenomenal  experi-
ences  resemble  images.  If  phenomenal  experi-
ence represents imagistically, then there cannot
be  SGP—and  p–precision  seems  dangerously
close to being trivial; if phenomenal experience
is non-imagistic, then we can allow for SGP and
render  p–precision  non-trivial—but  this  is  in
tension  with  some of  Block’s  other  work  and
our introspective evidence.
Maybe a fixed p–precision value need not be
bad for Block’s argument: if  the  p–precision of
percepts  is  fixed,  but  r–precision  varies,  then
there is a phenomenal feature that is not groun-
ded in  a representational  feature.  Thus,  GR is
false.  However,  Representationist  have  an  easy
reply: GR does not claim that all changes in rep-
resentational features must be mirrored in phe-
nomenal  features;  representational  features  only
need to account for phenomenal features. If  p–
precision is fixed, then it might be grounded in
20 The rule might be cultural, as with language, but also natural, as
with causes: that the word “red” means the color ◼ is based on a
cultural rule; that smoke means fire is based on a natural rule.
21 This case has been made by Kosslyn (1980, p. 31) as well as Gom-
brich (2002). But see also Haugeland (1981), Lewis (1971), and Jack-
son (1960).
there being r–precision at all. For Block, accept-
ing SGP might be a good option here—but not
elsewhere.
4.3 Introspective imprecision?
There might be a way to reject SGP, but still
account for our belief that we can experience
a color as red without experiencing it as crim-
son. Maybe  experiencing as  F without experi-
encing as any subsumable F does not apply to
phenomenal experiences, but to our  access to
them.  That  is,  maybe  there  is  introspective
rather  than  phenomenal  precision.22 This
might go along the lines of Block’s interpreta-
tion of the Sperling experiment: we experience
very  specific  shapes,  but  introspectively,  we
are only able to label them as  letters, not as
A,  B, etc. So maybe the phenomenal aspects
of our experience have fixed precision because
it is never solely generic; but our introspective
judgements are not fixed in precision because
we can introspect some experience solely gen-
erically. That is, we may  judge an experience
of  cayenne66 to  be  red  although  we  actually
experience  it  as  cayenne66.  If  perception  can
be more or less imprecise, why can’t “internal
perception”?23
The  notion  of  introspective  imprecision,
however, is not easily applied to the example of
the patches in Carrasco et al. (2004): if we intro-
spect on their appearance, then we judge them
not as imprecise,  but as  of  precisely  the same
contrast.
But maybe the imprecision of introspect-
ive  access  is  not  itself  introspectively  avail-
able:  Our  introspective  access  might  be  lim-
ited, such that all we can tell is that the patch
22 A reviewer noted that the limits of our vocabulary and our verbaliza-
tion skills more generally might account for the lack of discrimina-
tion skills just as well as introspective imprecision. Even though this
is a valuable point, I do not develop it here. First because I want to
stick as close to the occurrent percepts as possible, not to our cognit-
ive grasp of such percepts; second because introspective access pre-
cedes verbalization of the introspected; and third because failures of
verbalization do not account for “introspective data”. Block is unapo-
logetic  about  taking  introspection  seriously;  a  supportive  critic
should take it seriously as well.
23 Many philosophers liken introspection to a form of perception, e.g.,
Locke (2008,  II.xxvii.§9 & II.i.§4),  Kant (2008,  AA,III,tr.Äst.,§2),
Brentano (1874),  James (1890),  Boring (1953,  p. 170),  Armstrong
(1980, p. 61),  Lycan (1996, p. 334), and to some degree  Goldman
(2006, pp. 242ff.) as well as Churchland (1985, 2005).
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we attend to is like the patch we don’t attend
to in some respect. However, our general intro-
spective bias—that we think ourselves as au-
thoritative about our own minds leads us to
overrate what introspection offers: what we in-
trospect as being more or less alike is judged
as being strictly alike. This bias towards see-
ing  ourselves  as  introspectively  authoritative
independent of  whether  we introspected  suc-
cessfully or not might lead to a wide variety of
false beliefs about phenomenality.
The upshot would be that introspective
imprecision is compatible with Block’s distinc-
tion  between  access-  and  phenomenal  con-
sciousness.  But  introspective  imprecision
leaves it open whether SGP holds or not.  It
seems that we cannot decide based on intro-
spection whether the character of our percepts
or our introspective access to them is impre-
cise. We would need some other access to our
phenomenality in order to settle the issue; but
at  this  moment  in  time,  nothing  comes  to
mind that offers decisive evidence.24
24 This differs from the argument Block discusses: the attentional effect could
be perceptual and conscious, but it is not really accessible what or how much
actually changes in these circumstances due to introspective imprecision.
Block’s  writing  suggests  that  he  rejects
introspective  imprecision  in  this  article  (al-
though he ought to accept it when defending
the distinction between access-  and phenom-
enal consciousness). If  we reject it with him,
how can we save  the  idea  of  percepts  being
more or less p–precise?
4.4 Limitation on characters?
The idea that parts of perceptual wholes can
be  more  or  less  imprecise  seems  to  stand  in
tension with the idea that all appearance-fea-
tures can turn up anywhere in the phenomenal
field:  any appearance of  contrast may appear
in the fovea or periphery or where I attend or
don’t  attend,  etc.  This  had  the  odd  con-
sequence  in  my  reconstruction  that  all  phe-
nomenal parts have the same degree of p–preci-
sion. How might we avoid this?
We could assume that the range of char-
acters in the focus of attention and in the fo-
vea is most fine-grained. Imagine being able to
experience 100 shades of crimson in the atten-
ded fovea, but only 20 shades of crimson in the
unattended  periphery.  This  is  reasonable  for
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contrasts as our sensitivity to it declines with
eccentricity (Banks et al. 1991).
But this suggests that our experience is less
continuous in the periphery. Instead, it is stepwise.
This fits to the idea of precision having to do with
bandwidths: in the attended fovea, we experience
with a higher bit-rate than in the unattended peri-
phery. It is like seeing a picture in 24- instead of 6-
bit color depth (see figure 3).25
But the coarse-grained character of experi-
ence outside of attention is not introspectable: if a
light slowly changes color in our periphery, it does
not  look  like  it  is  doing  so  stepwise.  It  looks
smooth and continuous. So somehow this idea only
makes sense if we add the idea of introspective im-
precision—and thereby inherit its problems.
So  it  is  open how we should  marry  the
idea of variances in phenomenal precision of a
specific character with Block’s overall view of
conscious  experience.  Some  more  elucidation
would be highly appreciated.
5 Conclusion
Ned Block has provided a beautiful argument
against  Ground  Representationism—the  posi-
tion that for each phenomenal feature there is a
representational feature that accounts for it. At
its core is the notion of “phenomenal precision”:
if we accept it, it seems that the degree of phe-
nomenal precision of a percept changes differ-
ently to its degree of representational precision.
Thus, there is no representational feature that
accounts for this change in phenomenality—and
Ground Representationism is false.
I have suggested a way of estimating phe-
nomenal precision based on the assumption that
parts of perceptual wholes can share characters
independently of where they occur in the per-
ceptual whole, and on the notion of a just notic-
able difference as a lower bound of p–precision,
which is inspired by Block’s Phenomenal Preci-
sion Principle. Understood in this way, the ar-
gument  shows  what  it  is  supposed  to  show:
Ground Representationism is false.
But a deeper look at the notion of phe-
nomenal  precision  suggests  some tension  with
25 The difference is one of 16.777.216 to 64 different colors.
Block’s other work or with introspective evid-
ence, which Block takes seriously. In order to al-
low for variation in the degree of precision, we
have to accept that some of our experiences are
not  concrete,  but  solely  generic.  Such  “solely
generic phenomenology”, however, is a position
mainly held by opponents to Block’s Access- vs.
Phenomenal Consciousness-distinction. Without
accepting  solely  generic  phenomenology,  how-
ever, phenomenal precision seems either trivial
(there is no variation) or contradictory (a per-
cept can simultaneously have various degrees of
p–precision). So the argument against Ground
Representationism either hinges on a trivial or
self-contradictory notion,  or it  is  incompatible
with Block’s positions elsewhere. Patching this
problem by allowing a limited range of charac-
ters outside our attention is again at odds with
Block’s  other  writing  and  with  introspective
evidence.
What is needed is a better understanding
of phenomenal precision. What is it? How can
we estimate it? I have suggested some possible
ways to answer these questions, but all that I
could come up with seems at odds with what
Block  has  in  mind.  This  certainly  does  not
mean that there cannot be a suitable version of
phenomenal precision that avoids these pitfalls
—I am just unable to find it, and all that I can
construct somehow goes against Block. I hope
that Block has some ace up his sleeve, because
the notion of phenomenal precision appears too
fruitful to be abandoned too hastily.
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